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what Ruskin himself so insistently emphasizes—that the war which he praises is “only that in which *the full personal power of the human creature* is brought out in management of its weapons.” “For the final testing, observe, you must make the issue of battle strictly dependent on fineness of frame and firmness of hand.” “Whatever virtue or goodness there may be in this game of war, rightly played, there is none when you play it with a multitude of human pawns.” Thus it is the warfare of the Middle Ages, war of spear and sword on land and oars and galleys on the sea, which he extols. Of the modern sort—“the myriad-handed murder of multitudes, done boastfully in the daylight, by the frenzy of nations, and the immeasurable, unimaginable guilt, heaped up from hell to heaven, of their priests and kings”—what writer has ever set down a more terrible indictment?

If you have to take away masses of men from all industrial employment—to feed them by the labor of others—to move them and provide them with destructive machines, varied daily in national rivalry of inventive cost; if you have to ravage the country which you attack—to destroy for a score of future years its roads, its woods, its cities, and its harbors—and if, finally, having brought masses of men, counted by hundreds of thousands, face to face, you tear those masses to pieces with jagged shot, and leave the fragments of living creatures, countless beyond all help of surgery, to starve and parch, through days of torture, down into clots of clay—what book of accounts shall record the cost of your work—what book of judgment sentence the guilt of it? That, I say, is modern war—scientific war—chemical and mechanic war, worse even than the savage's poisoned arrow.

Let those who claim Ruskin for the militaristic camp commit *that* passage to memory, if they will. Then let them turn in the same book (“The Crown of Wild Olive”) to the “preparedness” parable of the two friendly neighbors who impoverish themselves to buy steel traps and spring guns to set along their common wall. Let them hunt up, notably in “Munera Pulveris,” “Fors,” and “Unto This Last,” some of the numerous pages in which Ruskin excoriates the conspiracy between militarism and capitalism to grind the necks of the poor. And particularly, if they are Americans, let them ponder over this passage from “Fors”:

There is no physical crime, at this day, so far beyond pardon—so without parallel in its untempted guilt, as the making of war machinery and invention of mischievous substance. Two nations may go mad and fight like harlots—Gods have mercy on them—you, who hand them carving-knives off the table, for leave to pick up a dropped sixpence, what mercy is there for *you*? We are so humane, forsooth, and so wise; and our ancestors had tar-barrels for witches; *we* will have them for everybody else, and drive the witches' trade ourselves, by daylight; we will have our cauldrons, please Hecate, cooled (according to the Darwinian theory) with baboons' blood, and enough of it, and sell hell-fire in the open streets.

In truth, few men have ever hated the spirit and the works of militarism with so thoroughgoing a hatred as did John Ruskin. “The first reason for all wars,” he wrote in “Fors,” “and for the necessity of national defenses, is that the majority of persons, high and low, in all European nations, are thieves, and in their hearts greedy of their neighbors' goods, land, and fame.” Even in our Civil War he could see no slightest good. “It interests me no more than a squabble between black and

red ants,” he wrote to Charles Eliot Norton. “If people want to fight, my opinion is that fighting will be good for them, and I suppose when they're tired they'll stop.” Led by passionate admiration of all things mediæval to extol even the wars of mediævalism, Ruskin was yet at heart a devout apostle of peace. One might easily compile an anthology of not inconsiderable size made up of those passages from his writings wherein war is denounced and peace is praised. And on the title page of such an anthology might well be set this sentence from “Time and Tide”:

As the work of war and sin has always been the devastation of this blossoming earth, whether by spoil or idleness, so the work of peace and virtue is also that of the first day of Paradise, to “dress it and to keep it.”

COMMON SENSE VIEW OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE

By LINTON SATTERTHWAITE

[In this article Mr. Satterthwaite refers specifically to two articles, pro and con, on the League to Enforce Peace, appearing in the *ADVOCATE OF PEACE* for November.]

THE discussion of the merits and defects of the League to Enforce Peace indicates that there must be many in need of greater clarity of thinking before the controversy will bear fruit in an intelligently formed sentiment. It is not here presumed to offer anything new. But it may be possible, by approaching the subject from a slightly different angle, to help to make clearer points that might otherwise remain obscure to some. If I grasp the pith of the discussion between Mr. Taber and Mr. Snow, it turns largely on the question of the use of force, of “compulsion,” against the individual member of the league. Right here I conceive that it may be the view of many that the scheme must break down.

To some it would seem, as apparently it does to Mr. Snow, that the undertaking of a league to “compel” submission of disputes, etc., smacks so strongly of war as to spell defeat of the ostensible purpose of the league—the maintenance of peace. What is compulsion by force but the domination by brute power of certain combined members of the league over a single member, or perhaps a group inferior in military strength to the combination assuming to speak by and for the league? How does this differ from war? How would it insure permanent peace? Might it not happen that the nation or nations needing to be disciplined would be strong enough to attempt resistance to the league, and thus actual armed conflict result, with consequent disruption? In other words, would not the the League to Enforce Peace have within it the elements of its own destruction?

To others it would be apparent that unless a league should have the power to compel obedience to its decisions it would be no more potent than a school-boy's debating society. That the member nations had agreed to submit their differences to arbitration or a conference would avail nothing if one of the members should determine to disregard the promise. The constitution of the league would be indeed a “scrap of paper.” All order, it may be urged, rests on force. Peace through a league of nations would, therefore, be in reality but a dream, if

the league be not clothed with that power of force, on which all peace is, in fact, based.

Does not the foregoing give, approximately, the differing views regarding the League to Enforce Peace which stand in the way of a union of pacifists in support of what should prove a mighty agency for promoting world-wide peace? Is there not a logical view which, if recognized, might make it possible for the holders of these opposing views to cooperate.

For the present purpose an analogy between a community of individuals and a community of nations may be assumed. More strictly, the analogy would be between a community of territorial and political groups, as are our own individual States. What, then, of the part played by force in the average civilized community? Is such a community's peace and order maintained by force? Does the safety of life and property depend on the police force in the city or the sheriff's posse in the country? The obvious answer seems to be, Yes. Certainly many people, even pacifists, would reply in the affirmative; for would not crime run riot if the police force were disbanded? To what use should we maintain courts to settle disputes by peaceful methods if the strong arm of the law were not behind the decision to compel the loser to submit?

It will be here granted that property would not be secure in the average civilized community without the existence and exercise of the power of what we call the police. And yet it also is here asserted that not in any civilized community where peace and order prevail does the security of life and property, in any true sense, depend upon the force of that police power. It may sound like a paradox; but it is nevertheless true that personal security does not rest on force, although at the same time security of every individual requires the existence of and sometimes the exercise of that force. Even a very imperfect analysis of the elements of community life will show the correctness of this statement.

Take any city, large or small, as an example. Where is one with a police force large enough to "protect" the lives and property of the citizens? There is no such city in this part of the world. If the security of the property and of the lives depended on the protection of the police officers, if the "force" which these officers wield alone stood between the citizens and violence to their persons or robbing of their property, far more than half of the families could be murdered and their property taken in a single night, in spite of all the police could do.

What, in fact, do we see if we look around among our neighbors? Do the police protect us against the burglarizing of our home by our neighbors Smith or Jones? Are we spared assassination at the hands of our friends Brown or White because they fear hanging or electrocution by decree of the courts? Are we secured against violence or theft at the hands of ninety-nine hundredths of the multitude of unknown persons we meet on the busy streets, through their fear of the application of "force" in the form of penalties? Manifestly not.

The truth is—and he who will but look about him will be convinced that it is so—that we are safe from harm at the hands of our neighbors and of the great mass of our fellow-citizens because they do not want to do us or our property harm any more than we wish to do wrong to them or to their property. We rest secure in

the confident belief that morally it is impossible for our neighbors to do us violence, though physically it would be the easiest thing in the world for them to kill and burn. Whether consciously or unconsciously, we daily pay tribute to the superiority of moral forces over physical powers. In short, something more than 90 per cent of the normal civilized community do not murder, do not steal, do not commit ordinary crime because they have been civilized out of the desire, out of the will to do the crimes, and into a more or less perfect respect for the rights of each other. They are not protected against each other by the police; they feel no need for such protection. The police officers are not expected to prevent them from criminal acts. They refrain from violence and crime not by "compulsion" of the community force. Their peaceful conduct is voluntary.

But there is in all but the most perfectly civilized communities a small percentage, a residuum of individuals, who do not voluntarily conform to the rules of conduct established by the general consensus of the community. These, roughly speaking, make up the so-called criminal class. To compel, so far as possible, obedience by this class to established law, to prevent this class from preying upon the far greater number who have no incentive to crime, the police force is called into existence. But this police force is maintained and employed by the 90 odd per cent of the citizens who need no police, who are not compelled by it, in order that this larger number may hold in subjection the small percentage whose conduct falls below and antagonizes the community's standards of civilized life.

Thus it is true that force is necessary for the protection of the peace and good order of the community; but the creation of that peace is primarily due to the fact that more than 90 per cent are peaceful and orderly without any force. While, therefore, force is necessary for a community lacking civic perfection, yet this police force is subordinate to and dependent on a dominant and controlling pacifism. Although the sheriff or marshal potentially stands back of every judgment of our courts, yet in nearly every instance the defeated litigant bows to decision or decree because he has been trained as a member of civilized society to do so, has no thought otherwise, and does not even think of the consequences of a contrary course. Submission is part of the rules of the game of civilization, and every good citizen will play the game according to the rules.

Now when it is proposed to form a league of civilized nations to "enforce" peace among themselves and, it is hoped, throughout the world, may not a consideration of the real nature of the "league" of individual citizens which constitutes community civil government suggest the possibilities as well as the limitations of such a league of nations and the part which "force" or "compulsion" may play in its operation? Let us refer to the analogy of the civil community.

Just as the organized civil community becomes possible because its members have grown to be peaceable without compulsion, so a league of nations to enforce peace will become possible only when the nations which are to compose it have each for itself acquired a national mind which desires peace for the sake of peace and has no fear of compulsion by the others to make it keep the peace so much desired. Not only must each nation-

member of the league have acquired this national mind, but it must likewise have gained a national confidence that the other members are of like mind, and therefore be free from all fear of aggression by any one or any possible group of members of the league. With a score or more of nations, big and little, educated to this state of national sentiment united in a league, the avowed purpose of which is to maintain peace among themselves and to defend all against aggression by other nations outside the league, we should have a close analogue to the community above described. Is it impossible to secure that state of national mind among a large number of nationalities? If so, then is a successful league to enforce peace impossible? If it is possible thus to educate a score or more of nations, then such a league is feasible; for this whole question of war or peace is simply a question of a state of mind. This is absolutely true, whether of individuals singly or collectively in national groups. If all thinkers and teachers would agree that war is irrational the battle against war would be already won.

There is no longer any cause that can be called a *reason* for a war between two civilized nations. Suspicion, fear, hysteria, misconception, or whatever it be, the state of mind of a people will determine whether or not it is possible to inveigle them into war. It follows, then, that a necessary preliminary to the foundation of a successful league to enforce peace will be the creation of a national sentiment that desires peace, as the average individual in a community desires it, and, further, a national confidence that the other proposed members of the league are possessed of the same sentiment. With this accomplished—and without substantially this much achieved the attempt at a league would be futile—the question of “compulsion” would, in all probability, easily adjust itself.

The proposed League to Enforce Peace might better be called the League to Maintain Peace, since, as above set forth, the nations who would form its membership must already have no fear of each other before the creation of the league will become practicable, even as the men who are the controlling element in a community have no fear of each other. If the men of a community fear each other and act on that fear, we have anarchy. If mutual distrust and fear are to characterize nations and they act accordingly, then international anarchy will inevitably result, in spite of combinations, alliances, or ententes. The really important work for Americans to do in the interest of the proposed league is to prepare our nation for membership rather than to frame a constitution for the league.

If our statesmen, if our publicists, would labor as faithfully to create the state of mind that makes for international peace, as they labor to create the opposite state of mind in order to secure appropriations for armament, the problem would be solved. Nay, civilization has reached that stage that the problem would speedily solve itself. There is not merely poetry, but a profound practical philosophy in Longfellow's poem, “The Arsenal at Springfield.” The spectacle of nations capable of entering into international postal unions warring with each other is too preposterous to be tolerated by a reasonable being. And it would not be tolerated by the various peoples if they were suffered to reach a rational frame of mind.

Should not, then, those pacifists who look askance at the proposed League to Enforce Peace because of the element of force, of “compulsion” involved, take a more sympathetic interest? May it not be their duty to aid in this attempt to organize the peace sentiment of the world on a greater scale than ever before? Is it not likely that the inherent defects will become apparent as the movement proceeds, and that international public sentiment will thus be educated to a recognition of the true basis of an enduring peace?

BRIEF PEACE NOTES

THE forthcoming peace conference of the International Socialist Bureau has declared, through its spokesman, that it is not to be employed to work for a separate peace and is in no way under German domination. This leader, a Hollander, Pieter Troelstra, declares that “what we want is universal peace, and we believe the time has come when there is a chance of achieving it.” An appeal has been addressed to the Socialist parties throughout the world asking for their support in the present difficulty of getting the conference under way. “Every day that the war continues,” says this appeal, “increases the suffering of the peoples, the hecatombs of the victims, and the billions of debt. The situation is becoming intolerable, and you should ask for peace terms. In the meanwhile, an immediate agreement between the Socialist parties of all countries is necessary in order that internationalism may again develop its strength.”

... Maximilian Harden, editor of the German radical paper, *Die Zukunft*, upon the declaration by President Wilson of a state of war with Germany, issued an article highly commending our present action and reviewing scathingly the steps by which Germany had rightfully incurred the enmity of the United States by offering its peace proposals as a blind to make possible the preparation for the present submarine warfare. He directs his venom at Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg and the Foreign Secretary, Dr. Zimmermann, and, coming to the lessons which the Germans must find in the present situation, he says: “What is now needed is not longing whimpers for peace, not the crazy peace missions of Scheidemann, Erzberger, and other amateur diplomatists, but a bold attempt to recognize again the plain truths of the situation and restore freedom of criticism and decision.”

... Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, in a recent address before the Commercial Club of Cincinnati, Ohio, declared that the war is to act as a stimulus in social reorganization, and that as a result of this there will be accomplished within three years after the war more than would have been possible in one hundred years of peace. He commended the work of Ex-President Taft in promoting the aims of the League to Enforce Peace, but in exception to the third plank of that League's platform he said:

We do not believe that the economic and military forces of the nations can be used to enforce peace; we do not believe that the people of this country would ever agree to make war for such a purpose or join other nations in making a common war. If you substitute the word “secure” for “en-